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At Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport,
security resides in a lot more than confiscating gels,
liquids and pointy objects. - This article, written from Linn’s perspective, is the second in a series based on Linn’s February trip to Israel as part of the Ultimate Counter Terrorism Mission.
- HSToday’s Anthony Kimery gets a first-hand look at Israel’s hundreds of miles of fencing
by Anthony L. Kimery
Tuesday, 29 April 2008
Fresh off a grueling 11-hour El Al flight
to the United States from Ben Gurion International Airport
near Tel Aviv, where only a few days before the airport’s
top security officials had immersed me in their unique approach
to security, I settled in to wait for my domestic connecting
flight home.
That unusually long wait provided me with
ample time to reflect on the fundamentally different approaches
to security applied by the United States and Israel. The
last notable act of terrorism at Ben Gurion was in 1972,
when a shooting inside the airport by Japanese Red Army
terrorists left 26 dead. There has not been a serious terrorist
attack there since, and no departing flight has ever been
hijacked.
Just like the security approach that’s
employed at the airport, El Al, Israel’s airline,
also employs the same security methodology around the world.
And it, too, enjoys a 100 percent record of having prevented
terrorism over the last 36 years, proving that the Israeli
model of security works.
But there have been irregularities. In 2002, four security
officers at Ben Gurion were fired for failing to detect
a handgun in a carry-on bag of a passenger traveling on
an El Al flight to New York. An investigation determined
that the gun had been allowed through as a result of human
error rather than any technical malfunction.
Despite this and a few other less severe incidents,
Ben Gurion and El Al enjoy unparalleled security, leading
some observers to rank the airport and airline as among
the most protected in the world. For example, Global Traveler
magazine’s readers have chosen El Al as the airline
with the best security. El Al’s security processes
are integrally tied to the fundamental security tactic at
Ben Gurion.
My fresh observations of Ben Gurion’s
security put the American approach in a whole new light.
With 12 hours to kill at John F. Kennedy International Airport,
I had plenty of time to observe American operations.
The more I watched screeners from the US Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) spend seemingly wasted time
shuffling plastic tubs back and forth and arbitrarily picking
people out of line—including me, who obviously didn’t
fit the profile of a terrorist for a pat-down and a search
of carry-on bags already run through the scanner—the
more I realized just how many of TSA’s processes were
arbitrary and inefficient and lacked the element of common
sense.
This isn’t to say TSA’s screeners
are not hard workers or are uninspired or are unpatriotic.
They’re not. But their culture and national experience
don’t provide them with the uniquely dedicated drive
that comes from the decades of terrorism that the Israelis
have experienced on their own soil.
“While we comply with all international
and US security regulations, we don’t believe they’re
all based on very good common sense approaches,” Nahun
Liss, head of the Planning, Control and Projects Department
of the Ben Gurion Security Division, candidly told me. “No
offense intended, it’s just we do things much differently
here,” he added, somewhat apologetically.
Ben Gurion does not impose US security screening
policies, like having passengers remove laptops from their
carrying cases and take off shoes, jackets, belts, etc.
The need for all that, Liss and his security colleagues
explained, had already been eliminated many security steps
back, beginning even before passengers stepped foot through
the doors of the airport.
That alone is a major departure from TSA’s approach
to security.
The multi-layered security approach at Ben
Gurion focuses on people’s behavior, rather than things
like scissors, small pocket knives and no more than 3 ounces
of nearly all personal toiletry items, which must be crammed
into one quart-sized, zip-top, clear plastic bag.
When we left Ben Gurion Airport, security
officers even let one of my colleagues, Maurice Goldman,
bring on board our flight his two samples of Inferno, the
next-generation sound alarm he markets. It stops cold anyone
within range by bombarding them with a deafening, unbearable
sound—I know, I heard it. And it is activated by a
small, 12-volt Ni-MH battery. It would never get past TSA—but
it didn’t bother the Israelis.
People-focused security was pioneered at Ben
Gurion. It involves singling suspicious people out of airport
crowds based on specific facial expressions, body language,
behavior, speech—even attire—and then asking
them questions. It’s all been methodically designed
to identify suspicious conduct that even TSA acknowledges
can be related to surveillance or pre-attack behavior traits.
They are questions specially designed to identify “anything
out of the ordinary, anything that does not fit,”
explained a Ben Gurion undercover screener.
All of Ben Gurion’s security personnel,
overt and covert, are trained in “security profiling,”
or behavior pattern recognition, Liss said.
Raphael “Rafi” Ron, Ben Gurion’s
security director for five years, has said Israel’s
advantage is that it long ago came to terms with the human
component of terrorism. In other words, terrorism is carried
out by people. He told me that Ben Gurion’s security
has clearly demonstrated that miscreants can be found and
stopped by an effectively robust security methodology that
is focused on … people!
Similarly, in responding to complaints by
civil libertarians in the United States that the pilot TSA
behavior recognition program, Screening Passengers by Observation
Techniques (SPOT), currently being studied by TSA is prima
facie racial profiling, TSA Secretary Kip Hawley strongly
disagreed, noting, “If you rely on what you think
a terrorist looks like, you’re going to miss them
… terrorists are very smart …”
Asked about Hawley’s remark, Liss shrugged
his shoulders as if to say, “No duh,” and said,
“That’s exactly right.”
Using a common sense approach, Ron said, “We
assumed that before an attack could take place, there had
to be a person with the intention of carrying out an attack
and second, there had to be a weapon. But on Sept. 11, we
learned that a weapon is not necessary. What remains is
the human factor. Without a person who intends to do harm,
an attack will not take place.”
Consequently, Ron said TSA’s obsession with “things”
is “unintelligent … everybody understands—including
the passengers—that the relevance of your nail file
to the security of the flight is nil. It doesn’t exist.
… By wasting your time and attention on [such things]
… you are simply not aiming in the right direction.”
Liss echoed Ron. “Your TSA focuses on
things and not people, and we have found that’s not
a very effective approach to identifying and isolating terrorists.”
TSA’s lack of common sense in approaching
security has provoked recurring criticism, especially since
it has more obviously reacted to the threat of things known
to have been used by terrorists—like sharp objects
and liquid explosives—rather than focusing on a person’s
intent to use a thing, which could be as innocuous as a
tightly rolled up in-flight magazine. Ben Gurion security
authorities explained that the notion that in-flight problems
can be prevented by prohibiting the most obvious problematic
“things” prior to boarding is, well, ludicrous.
In contrast to Israel, though, in the United
States there’s been a hue and cry over concerns that
focusing on people will violate their privacy and civil
rights. As a result, the United States has opted to refrain
from making humans the centerpiece of airport security and
does not question either passengers or anyone else roaming
the airports.
“A big mistake,” Liss said, unabashedly.
Because Ben Gurion delves into the human psyche
to ferret out potential terrorists, the experience can come
across as draconian, obnoxious and intrusively personal
to anyone unfamiliar with it—especially for the citizens
of democracies concerned with privacy rights.
The process begins more than a kilometer from
the entrance to Ben Gurion at a checkpoint where very intimidating
machine-gun-toting personnel stop every vehicle to scrutinize
both the vehicle and the occupants for “suspicious
signs.” This is where the behavior pattern recognition
screening begins, with a particular profile for appearance
and behavior of entering vehicles and people and often based
on very fresh threat intelligence. Only after passing the
scrutiny of this first line of screeners is any vehicle
allowed to proceed to the airport’s entrance.
Should security personnel find something untoward,
however, then a “full-stage” security check
is performed. This involves pulling the vehicle over and
engaging the passengers in short conversations designed
to identify any hint of dishonesty while the vehicle is
physically searched, including the use of dogs to sniff
out possible explosives.
“We believe dogs are the most
accurate and reliable means for detecting explosives,”
Liss explained, noting, however, that each dog is used for
only 20 minutes at a time and then allowed to “recover”
for four hours before being used again.
Meanwhile, the vehicle is subjected to a special
inspection system that examines the undercarriage. That
process can take as long as an hour.
Humans are next profiled by undercover personnel
monitoring both passengers and “pedestrians”
accompanying them outside the airport entrance, and again
as passengers and anyone accompanying them are greeted by
security personnel at check-in once inside the airport.
All the while, covert “security profilers”
are watching all passengers and pedestrians. If screeners
spot someone behaving according to certain criteria, they
will dispatch an armed security official (armed overt security
forces back up all undercover profilers) to engage that
person in further conversation, which, again, is designed
to elicit dishonesty and other indicators of concern.
“When a terrorist comes to the airport
to gather intelligence, he mustn’t know where security
is located, making it difficult to plan attacks,”
Eran Duvdevani, an anti-terror expert and former Israeli
army colonel, said, noting that Ben Gurion’s undercover
security screeners are vital to security.
All baggage being checked in is immediately
put through a scanner. If anything suspicious is detected
or if a person has been flagged for additional scrutiny
while being questioned in the initial security line, that
person is directed to take his or her scanned and carry-on
luggage to another checkpoint. There, screeners likely ask
the person to remove the questionable item from the luggage
for further examination. Meanwhile, the person continues
to be questioned as part of the progressive effort to isolate
dishonesty and deception.
Only after security profilers are satisfied
that the person poses no risk at this point is he or she
cleared to proceed to the ticketing counter. After that,
the person proceeds to passport control and final screening
of both the traveler and his or her carry-on luggage. At
passport control, there’s more scrutiny before a country
exit clearance is given. Carry-on baggage is placed in a
scanner, there is more questioning, and then the person
is on the way to the boarding gate—all without anyone
having to remove shoes or confiscate water bottles.
At every step, passengers are never separated
from their luggage. This allows screeners to focus on the
person rather than the baggage.
Any irregularities at any of the checkpoints
or in between can, however, result in enhanced scrutiny.
And this can involve a physical search, the disassembling
of any electronics and a nearly microscopic examination
of carry-ons. Ben Gurion maintains squads of engineers trained
to disassemble, examine and reassemble all electronics,
inspect shoes—including inserting a device that looks
like a metal hypodermic needle into a shoe’s rubber
sole to analyze extracted air or content—baggage,
clothing and any other objects with very specialized equipment.
They’ve got one row of nothing but dozens and dozens
of screwdrivers in different shapes and sizes. They are
very prepared.
It’s at this stage that a person may
be asked to step onto the MagShoe, the development of which
was initiated by the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) and executed
by New York-based IDO Security in conjunction with the technical
branch of ISA.
MagShoe is a metal detector designed to detect
concealed weapons in shoes and around ankles. Last September,
former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge’s consulting firm,
Ridge Global LLC, was hired by IDO as a consultant. Magshoe
is currently being tested by TSA.
According to Liss, complete strip searches
are not performed. If someone’s behavior or other
red flags call for a person to remove his or her clothing,
that person is not required to remove his or her undergarments.
Physical searches also are conducted by the same gender
as the person being examined, and done in private rooms
under strict and controlled conditions.
At any point throughout any of this, if something
spooks a screener, a single, quickly accessible alarm can
easily be activated that immediately sends armed security
personnel scrambling. Similarly, should an airport threat
emerge, the Duty Security Manager has authority to completely
lock down the entire airport in seconds.
Despite what from a perfunctory glance might
seem to be a long and arduous security check-in regimen,
Liss said, “On average, it takes one and a half hours
from check-in through final security and no more than 20
minutes in the security lines.”
Liss said a large number of the security personnel
at Ben Gurion are “high-quality students” in
or out of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). “We find
that this way we get the highest quality and capable people,”
he told HSToday.
Despite Israel’s hands-down success
in focusing on people—El Al and Ben Gurion security
screeners have effectively unmasked terror threats during
their scrutiny of peoples’ behavior—some in
and out of TSA continue to assert the people-focused concept
is unproven, potentially ineffectual and institutes state-based
racism. It’s these critics who have problems with
TSA’s SPOT initiative, which has already trained several
thousand employees in behavior pattern recognition.
Still, TSA’s overall security approach
remains focused on material things.
TSA’s Hawley assured lawmakers in November
that he has confidence in SPOT and said its use will increase
commensurate with funding. However, under a Democratic Congress
ideologically opposed to anything threatening privacy rights,
funding may not soon be forthcoming—regardless of
the Israelis’ proven track record—according
to some Capitol Hill observers.
“You have to ask yourself whether any
of these lawmakers have ever taken the time to understand
how this works or least of all visited Ben Gurion,”
quipped Alon Stivi, president and founder of Direct Measures
International, an Orange, Calif.-based security consulting
company, and a former veteran Israeli Special Forces member.
The Israelis make no apologies for finding
many airports’ security procedures foolish—as
well as potentially lethal, like the continuing practice
of curbside luggage check-in.
“From a security point of view, curbside check-in
is very dangerous,” Liss said, shaking his head in
disbelief that the practice even exists—anywhere!
As for luggage, within a few years Ben Gurion
plans to implement yet another $70 million layer of scanning
technology to fully examine 100 percent of checked-in items
prior to stowage on any aircraft. Interestingly, though,
Liss said the airport does not have plans to incorporate
Z-backscatter technology, which can look through clothing.
Liss said the technology has not yet been approved for use
in Israel, not because of any safety concerns but rather
because security authorities haven’t determined is
efficacy.
Liss said the progressive levels of screening
designed to identify threats so far has removed the need
to employ Z-backscatter scanners.
When it comes to overall physical security,
Ben Gurion’s armed forces and defensive systems are
unrivaled, effective and lethal.
Extrapolating Ben Gurion security to the United
States is problematic on many levels. For one, to deploy
the same degree of physical scanning technologies that are
at Ben Gurion at every airport in America would, in today’s
fiscal climate, come with an unpalatable price tag. Even
planned technology deployments have yet to be achieved.
As for having equivalent armed forces, the problem would
likely be Americans’ unease over seeing the kind of
weaponry that Israelis are all too accustomed to seeing
every day—everywhere.
But as for implementing a broad, SPOT-like
frontline defense, well, that might just be within reach,
authorities say. Yet, even SPOT’s widespread implementation
will inspire certain political and cultural heartburn. A
tougher hurdle to overcome than the cost would be constitutional
concerns that it’s simply racist profiling, no matter
how effective it is in thwarting terrorists at Ben Gurion.
America is slow to act until the unthinkable
happens.
But as an American-born Israeli now in Israel
serving in the IDF put it to me: “Your whole thinking
changes when you’re confronted with non-stop terrorism
on your doorstep.”
Editor’s Note: This article was based on reporting
done during The Ultimate Counter Terror Mission to Israel,
a briefing and tour conducted by Shaneson Consulting Group,
Long Beach, NY. HSToday was the media sponsor of that tour.
It’s easy
to see how Ben Gurion’s intensely people-based security
focus frequently upsets non-Israelis’ sensibilities.
If you Google “Ben Gurion security,”
you’ll see what I mean. While some of the rants that
can be found—and I can’t help but believe they’re
exaggerated—the unsurprising experiences of other
complainers probably were provoked by their expressed indignance
over the personalized security process to which they were
subjected.
It’s not that Ben Gurion’s people-focused
security staffers are inherently sadistic or enjoy going
out of their way to be ultra-personally intrusive. Rather,
they’ve refined a behavioral profiling process for
identifying potentially suspicious conduct. Once detected,
the process triggers a progressive ratcheting up of an inquisitiveness
that has been effectively designed and refined over many
years to ultimately isolate outright lying and deception—for
whatever reason. The goal is to determine if a person is
an actual threat.
Simply put: If you’re not a terrorist,
you’ll be getting on your flight. And if you’re
just inordinately disgruntled, well, you’re likely
to find yourself subjected to increasing isolation and interrogation
to determine if there’s more to your irritability
than meets the eye.
These people are very serious. It’s
why, coming or going, travelers should give themselves a
minimum of three or more hours to get through security.
Even if you’re a “mokadon” passenger like
I was—someone who security already knows and awards
a wee bit of courtesy—it only lets you bypass everyone
else in line; it does not excuse you from being subjected
to the same security once you’re in front of everyone
else.
Unless you’re a member of the
Israeli parliament, the Knesset, with the right to walk
past all security unimpeded, you’re going to be subjected
to the same security procedures as everyone else. But, as
I learned from the head of security at the Knesset, there
was an as-yet publicly undisclosed potential security problem
a while back with a former Arab Knesset member and his driver—who
had been identified as a member of a known terrorist organization—that
put even the latitude afforded Knesset members into question.
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